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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a claim by Appellant Silicon International Ore, LLC ("SIO") that it

was entitled to purchase silica sand in perpetuity from a quartzite mine owned by Respondent
Monsanto Company ("Monsanto"). When it was denied access to this silica sand, SIO sought
damages through this litigation.
As against Monsanto, SIO claimed entitlement to this alleged perpetual right to purchase
silica sand based on a number of alternative theories. 1 First, SIO alleged that Monsanto verbally
agreed to this perpetual arrangement. 2 Alternatively, SIO alleged that Monsanto was estopped
from denying it access to the silica sand based upon equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.
Monsanto filed for summary judgment, arguing that no verbal agreement was ever
reached between the parties and that any verbal agreement was unenforceable because it violated
the statute of frauds set forth in LC. § 28-2-201(1) and because its essential terms were vague,
indefinite and uncertain. Monsanto also argued that SI O's causes of action for equitable estoppel
or quasi-estoppel should be dismissed.
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto, SIO appealed.

1

In this litigation, SIO also asserted claims against Respondent Washington Group International,
Inc. Those claims will not be addressed in this brief.
2
Throughout the Appellant's Opening Brief, SIO refers to this as "the contract" without properly
clarifying that it was alleged to be only a "verbal" agreement.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Operation of Quartzite Mine by WGI under First Quartzite Agreement

Monsanto through its wholly owned subsidiary P4 Production owns a quartzite mine near
Soda Springs, Idaho. 3

Since 1988, Monsanto has contracted with Respondent Washington

Group International, Inc. ("WGI") to operate this quartzite mine. 4 WGI operated the quartzite
mine under a Quartzite Agreement executed between it and Monsanto (hereinafter "First
Quartzite Agreement"). 5
Quartzite is commonly known as silica. 6

WGI's operation of this quartzite mme

generated silica that was too small to be used in Monsanto's ma.'1ufacturing process. 7 This
byproduct is commonly referred to as silica sand. 8
B.

Written Contracts for Sale of Processed Silica Sand to SIO

In early 2000, SIO contacted Monsanto expressing an interest in acquiring silica sand. 9
Monsanto and WGI jointly met with SIO to discuss SIO's proposal and business plan to market
silica sand for use in such things as playgrounds, golf courses, asphalt, grout and stucco. 10
3

R. Vol. 2, pp. 138, 145.
Id. at pp. 138, 145-202. Note that the record contains a Quartzite Agreement executed in 1993
between Monsanto and WGI (fka Conda Mining Inc.). Id. at pp. 139, 145. The first page of this
1993 Quartzite Agreement indicates that WGI had been operating the quartzite mine since 1988.
Id. at p. 145.
5
Id. at pp. 145-202. Please note that this was not the "First" Quartzite Agreement between
Monsanto and WGL See footnote 4. The term "First" is used in this brief with regard to this
Quartzite Agreement merely for purposes of contrasting it with a subsequent Quartzite
Agreement discussed later in this brief.
6
Id. at p. 138.
7
Id. at pp. 138-39.
s Id.
4

6

On May 3, 2000, after initial discussions and completion of feasibility studies, SIO
delivered a proposed contract to Monsanto. 11 The proposed contract was drafted by SI0. 12 The
terms of the proposed contract required (1) that SIO would purchase the silica sand directly from
Monsanto; (2) that Monsanto would at its expense provide SIO with a building and the land
necessary to process the silica sand; (3) that SIO would purchase a minimum of 500 tons of silica
sand in the first year and more in the following years; and (4) that the agreement would remain
effective for twenty (20) years.

13

Monsanto did not execute SIO's proposed contract. 14

Although it was amenable to

making silica sand available to SIO, Monsanto was not interested in doing so under the proposed
terms. Among other terms Monsanto would not accept, Monsanto was not interested in selling
the silica sand directly to SIO which would effectively bypass WGI, who at that time had been
operating the quartzite mine for over twelve (12) years. 15
Therefore, it was decided that SIO should contract directly with WGI instead of
Monsanto to acquire the silica sand. 16 This required the execution of an addendum to the First

9

Id. at p. 140.
Id. at pp. 140, 197.
11
Id. at pp. 140, 236-38. The proposed contract identified "Solutia Inc." as the seller of the silica
sand. Monsanto was operating the quartzite mine under that name at that time. Id.
12
Id. at p. 140.
13
Id. at pp. 140, 236-38.
14
Id. at p. 140.
is Id.
16
Id. at pp. 140, 240.
10
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Quartzite Agreement between Monsanto and WGI, the execution of a contract between WGI and
SIO, and the execution of a Confidentiality Agreement.
On November 29, 2000, Monsanto and WGI executed an Addendum to Quartzite

Agreement (hereinafter "First Addendum") pursuant to which (1) WGI was authorized to
construct and operate a silica sand processing facility at the quartzite mine to be used to process
and bag silica sand; and (2) WGI was required to pay Monsanto $13.00 per ton of "finished"
silica sand "sold by [WGI] to a third party." 17 The addendum provided that WGI "anticipate[d]
entering into one or more contracts with [SIO] related to ... the sale of the processed silica
sand." 18
Two days later on December 1, 2000, SIO and WGI executed a Master Agreement
pursuant to which (1) WGI agreed to provide "a portion of the silica sand within its control" to
SIO; (2) SIO agreed to pay for the construction of a processing plant for the silica sand; (3) SIO

agreed to also pay WGI to operate the processing plant to dry, screen, and bag the silica sand; (4)
SIO agreed to also pay WGI an additional $13.00 per ton for the processed silica sand; and (5)
WGI agreed to load the bagged silica sand onto trucks provided by SI0. 19 Pursuant to paragraph
7 of the Master Agreement, title to the silica sand passed to SIO upon delivery of the silica sand

by WGI.2° Lastly, by its own terms, the Master Agreement was effective for a period of only

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
18

at pp. 174-75.
at p. 175.
at pp. 204-13.
at p. 206.
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five (5) years, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties. 21

Because the Master

Agreement contemplated the transfer of title to the silica sand for a price, it clearly contemplated
that WGI would be selling processed silica sand to SI0.

22

On December 19, 2000, Monsanto and SIO executed a Confidentiality Agreement
wherein they both agreed to keep confidential all information obtained from the other concerning
their respective business operations. 23
On this same day, December 19, 2000, Robert Sullivan, who had signed the Master
Agreement on behalf of SI0,

24

sent a letter to Monsanto in which he expressed his satisfaction

with the Master Agreement and stated, "we are pleased that the intent seems to be a long-term
relationship." 25 Whatever Mr. Sullivan may have intended by this statement, the Master
Agreement, which he had signed only eighteen (18) days previously, clearly provided that the
relationship was for only a five-year period. As a matter of law, Mr. Sullivan's letter did not
extend the Master Agreement beyond that five-year period.

21

Id. at p. 207. It is undisputed that the parties never agreed in writing to extend this five-year
period.
22
Id. at p. 206. SIO's contention that the Master Agreement did not provide for the "sale" of
silica sand is erroneous. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7. Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code defines a "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price." I.C. § 28-2-106(1 ). This is exactly what the terms of the Master Agreement provided.
23
Id. at pp. 216-216 (Note that the Confidentiality Agreement consists of two pages. Both pages
are labeled by the record clerk as page "216").
24
Id. at p. 210.
r ) R. Vol. 3, p. 449.
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C.

Execution of the Second Quartzite Agreement and Second Addendum

The First Quartzite Agreement was by its terms to expire at the end of 2002. 26 Monsanto
and WGI decided to renew their First Quartzite Agreement prior to its expiration. Accordingly,
on September 24, 2001, Monsanto and WGI executed a new Quartzite Agreement for an
additional seven (7) year period (hereinafter "Second Quartzite Agreement"). 27 Pursuant to its
terms, the Second Quartzite Agreement terminated and replaced the First Quartzite Agreement. 28
On March 1, 2002, Monsanto and WGI executed a new Addendum to Quartzite
Agreement (hereinafter "Second Addendum") which terminated and replaced the First
Addendum. 29 The terms of the Second Addendum were materially identical to the terms of the
First Addendum, except that the Second Addendum provided (1) that WGI would pay Monsanto
between $3.00 to $13.00 per ton of processed silica sand based upon particle size which was
either "sold by SIO" or "used by [WGI] itself; and (2) that "[t]itle to the silica sand sold by SIO
shall pass directly from [Monsanto] to SIO upon processing ... subject to payment." 30 The
Second Addendum also provided that Monsanto would with certain conditions "make available
sufficient feed sand to allow SIO to sell up to 25,000 tons per year of product sand." 31

26

R. Vol. 2, p. 149.
Id. at pp. 177-202.
28
Id. at p. 177.
29
Id. at pp. 194-97.
30 Id.
31
Id. at p. 197.
27
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D.

SI O's Business Operation under the Master Agreement

Sometime after executing the Master Agreement with WGI on December 1, 2000, SIO
set up its operations in the quartzite mine. 32

In conformance with the terms of the Master

Agreement, SIO purchased processed silica sand directly from WGI and in returned tendered the
agreed upon price per ton to WGI. 33 At no time did SIO ever tender any payments directly to
Monsanto.

34

SIO's business was commercially unsuccessful. Its own records reveal that it failed to
make any profit during any year of its operation. 35 SIO's yearly operating loss was between
($97,598) and ($132,525). 36
Although the Master Agreement between WGI and SIO expired by its terms on
December 1, 2005, WGI continued selling processed silica sand to SIO for an additional two
years. 37 However, by letter dated December 28, 2007, WGI notified SIO that it would no longer
be providing processed silica sand to SIO after the year end. 38

32

Id. at p. 140; R. Vol. 3, p. 360.

33

R. Vol. 2, pp. 140-41.
_; Id. at p. 141.
35
R. Vol. 3, pp. 296-301, 339-40.

'4

36
37

Id.

R. Vol. 2, pp. 141, 207. Although the Master Agreement between WGI and SIO expired by its
own terms on December 1, 2005, the Second Addendum between WGI and Monsanto reference
sand availability and payments through the end of 2007. R. Vol. 2, p. 197. This would explain
why WGI was able to sell silica sand to SIO through the end of 2007 despite the expiration of the
Master Agreement.
38
Id. at p. 218.
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After various discussions and emails, Monsanto delivered a letter to SIO advising SIO
that it would be permitted to continue processing and bagging silica sand through April 29,
2008. 39 Monsanto advised that it would not provide any additional silica sand to SIO after that
date. 40 Thereafter, SIO dismantled its operations in the quartzite mine and removed its buildings
and equipment. 41 After SIO dismantled its operations, Monsanto and WGI have not operated a
silica sand processing business in the quartzite mine.

III.

42

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On December 31, 2009, SIO filed a Complaint against Monsanto and WGI seeking

damages for what it believed was a violation of its alleged right to continue purchasing processed
silica sand from the quartzite mine. 43 Despite having not made any profit in seven (7) years, SIO
sought to recover $4,729,000 for damages allegedly incurred through October 2011, an
additional $991,401 in prejudgment interest, and an additional $25,607,000 for alleged future
lost profits.

44

Ignoring Monsanto's refusal to execute SIO's draft contract and also the written contract
between itself and WGI, SIO alleged in its Complaint that SIO and Monsanto had entered into a
separate verbal agreement with Monsanto for the purchase and sale of the very same silica sand

Iid. at p. 231.
Id.
41
Id. atp. 141.
42 Id.
43
R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20.
44
R. Vol. 3, pp. 409-14; R. Vol. 4, pp. 664-68.
39

40
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it had entered into a written agreement to acquire from WGI.

45

SIO claimed that this alleged

separate and duplicative verbal agreement consisted of the following terms:
(1)

Monsanto agreed that it would furnish SIO with "certain agreed-upon quantities"
of silica sand and allow SIO to process that silica sand; 46

(2)

SIO agreed that it would pay Monsanto in "agreed-upon amounts" for the silica
sand, would comply with all applicable environmental, safety and control
regulations, and would comply with limitations imposed by Monsanto with regard
to markets in which SIO would sell the processed silica sand; 47

(3)

Monsanto agreed that SIO would be entitled to receive silica sand indefinitel/8 so
long as SIO did not breach any of the aforementioned terrns; 49 and

( 4)

Monsanto agreed that it "would not abruptly terminate its agreement within a few
years after SIO had commenced its business." 50

45

R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20.
R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ,11); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ,4).
47 Id.
48
In paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Complaint, SIO alleges that the duration of the verbal
agreement was "perpetual" and "open-ended." R. Vol. 1, p. 7 (italics added). Notwithstanding,
SIO appears to have change its position on appeal by arguing that "[t]he evidence before the
district court on summary judgment was that Monsanto, like SIO, contemplated a long-term
relationship--not necessarily perpetual.. .of something more than seven years." Appellant's
Opening Brief at p. 24.
49
R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ~11 ); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ,4).
46
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SIO claimed that this alleged verbal agreement remained enforceable separate and apart from its
subsequently executed Master Agreement with WGL

51

Even though the Master Agreement was

rightfully terminated by WGI after expiration of its five-year term and SIO does not challenge
that fact on appeal, SIO claims that the alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto remains
separately enforceable - indefinitely.

Based upon the alleged the verbal agreement, SIO asserted four causes of action against
Monsanto: (a) breach of the alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto; (b) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the verbal agreement; (c) equitable estoppel, and
(d) quasi-estoppel. 52 On February 26, 2010, Monsanto filed its Answer, generally denying SIO's
claims and asserting certain affirmative defenses including a defense based upon the statute of
frauds set forth in LC.§ 28-2-201(1). 53
On January 25, 2011, Monsanto filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing (1) that
the verbal contract alleged by SIO was unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in LC.

50

R. Vol. I, p. 5 (Complaint at fil 7); R. Vol. 3, p. 440 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at fi8). It
should be noted that SIO incorrectly suggests on page 15 of its Opening Brief that there are
additional terms in the alleged verbal agreement whereby Monsanto agreed (1) to permit SIO to
build, operate and access a silica sand processing plant, and (2) to furnish sand "in quantities
sufficient for [SIO] to meet its business need." SIO claims that these additional terms are
supported by the record at pages R. 438-39 and 443-46. However, a review of those pages from
the record readily reveals that these additional alleged terms are neither mentioned nor
supported. Therefore, they should be disregarded for purposes of this appeal.
51
R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20 (Complaint).
52
Id. SIO also asserted certain causes of action against WGL Those causes of action will not be
addressed in this brief.
53
Id. at p. 36.
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§ 28-2-201 (1 ); (2) that the verbal agreement alleged by SI 0 was unenforceable because the terms

as alleged were vague, indefinite and uncertain; (3) that SIO could not prove damages because it
never generated a profit; (4) that SIO did not have the proper corporate status to file the lawsuit;
and (5) that SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel should be
. . d.54
d1sm1sse

On April 29, 2011, SIO filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary

Judgment. 55 On May 6, 2011, Monsanto filed a Reply. 56
In support of its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, SIO filed an Affidavit
of Todd Sullivan. 57

In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, Mr. Sullivan testifies about statements

contained within an email dated March 14, 2008 that he purportedly received from Mr. Hart
years after Mr. Hart's employment with Monsanto had ended (hereinafter "Hart's 3/14/2008
email"). 58 A copy of the email was attached to the affidavit. 59 On May 6, 2011, Monsanto filed
a Motion to Strike from this affidavit any reference to statements made in Hart's 3/14/2008 email
on the basis that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. 60

On May 13, 2011, SIO filed an

54

Id. at pp. 79-97; R. Vol. 5, pp. 724-38.
R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-89.
56
R. Vol. 5, pp. 724-38.
57
R. Vol. 3, p. 439.
ss Id.
55

59

Id. at pp. 447-48.
R. Vol. 5, pp. 752-60. Monsanto's Motion to Strike also sought to exclude other emails
mentioned in affidavits filed by SIO in opposition to summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion with regard to those other emails. Monsanto does not challenge that decision
on appeal.

60

15

Opposition to the Motion to Strike, arguing that the email was not hearsay and alternatively was
admissible under the residual hearsay exception found in I.R.E. 803(24). 61
On May 13, 2011, a hearing on Monsanto's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion
to Strike was held. 62 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court took the matter under
63
.
adv1sement.

On September 21, 2011, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order,
granting the Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email and granting summary
judgment in favor of Monsanto. With regard to the Motion to Strike, the district court granted
the motion and excluded from Mr. Sullivan's affidavit the reference to Hart's 3114/2008 email on
the basis that it constituted hearsay which did not fit within the residual hearsay exception of
I.RE 803(24).

64

With regard to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court dismissed SIO's
causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing on the basis that the underlying verbal agreement as alleged by SIO
was unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1). 65 The district court
also granted summary judgment as to SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasiestoppel on the basis that the underlying verbal agreement which SIO sought to enforce under

61

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.

62

at pp. 761-70.
at pp. 771-72.
at pp. 782-83.
at pp. 786-89.
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those theories was unenforceable because its essential terms were vague, indefinite and
.

uncertam.

66

On October 7, 2011, the district court entered Judgment in accordance with its
Memorandum Decision and Order. 67 On November 18, 2011, SIO filed its Notice of Appeal. 68

66

Id. at pp. 789-92.
Id. at pp. 799-801.
68
Id. at pp. 802-07.
67
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's causes of
action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing on the basis that the alleged verbal agreement was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1)?

2.

·whether the district court's grant of summary judgment as to SIO's causes of action for
breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the alleged verbal
agreement was enforceable due to its essential terms being vague, indefinite and
uncertain?

3.

Whether the district court properly considered Monsanto's motion for summary judgment
with regard to SI O's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel?

4.

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's cause of
action for equitable estoppel?

5.

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's cause of
action for quasi-estoppel?

6.

Whether the district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's
3/14/2008 email should be affirmed?

7.

Whether Monsanto is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Idaho Supreme Court "reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de

nova." Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 106, Docket
No. 37868 (Idaho Sup. Ct. April 26, 2012).

A trial court's grant of summary judgment is

reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial court. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,
499, 112 P .3d 785, 787 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
Under this standard, a reviewing court will construe all disputed facts and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sprinkler Irr. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho
691, 695-96, 85 P.3d 667, 671-72 (2004). Where "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review."

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644
(2006).
II.

MOTION TO STRIKE
"The admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) is a threshold question the trial court

must analyze before applying the rules governing motions for summary judgment." Herrera v.

Estay, 146 Idaho 67 4, 680, 201 P.3d 64 7, 654 (2009). "The trial court must look at the affidavit
or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would
render the testimony admissible." Id. "The admission of evidence is committed to the discretion
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of the trial court." Id. This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 P.3d 180, 182 (2003). Thus, this Court
considers whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial
court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3)
the trial court reached its decision through an exercise ofreason. Herrera, 146 Idaho at 680, 201
P.3d at 654.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO SIO'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE ALLEGED VERBAL
AGREEMENT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ON THE BASIS THAT THE ALLEGED VERBAL
AGREEMENT WAS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
IN I.C. § 28-2-201(1).
SIO's causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are both contingent upon the enforceability of the
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. On summary judgment, the district court concluded
that the verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in LC. § 28-2201(1), which provides in pertinent part the following:
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that
a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
The district court found that no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the fact that
the alleged verbal agreement was "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more"
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and that no document signed by Monsanto existed which evidenced the alleged agreement. 69
Based upon those findings, the district court concluded that the verbal agreement was
unenforceable under LC. § 28-2-201 (1 ). The conclusion of the district court should be affirmed.

A.

The district court correctly found that the verbal agreement alleged by SIO
was "a contract for the sale of goods" for purpose of Article 2 of the Idaho
Uniform Commercial Code and LC.§ 28-2-201(1).

On appeal, SIO argues that the district court erred in finding that the alleged verbal
agreement was "a contract for the sale of goods" for purposes of Article 2 of the Idaho Unifo1m
Commercial Code and I.C. § 28-2-201(1). SIO's argument is without merit.
First, SIO argues that the verbal agreement was not "a contract for the sale of goods"
solely because the verbal agreement included both "sale" and "non-sale" terms. 70

SIO admits

that the verbal agreement involved the sale of goods by alleging Monsanto agreed to supply
silica sand to SIO and SIO agreed to pay Monsanto for that silica sand. 71

SIO also admitted in

its opposition to summary judgment that "SIO paid Monsanto directly in exchange for sand sold
by Monsanto."72 Notwithstanding this admission, SIO claims that the alleged verbal agreement
was not "solely for the sale of goods." 73 SIO claims that, in addition to involving the sale of
goods, the verbal agreement also included additional "non-sale" terms, such as: (1) SIO agreeing

69

R. Vol. 5, pp. 786-89.
Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 15-19.
71
Id. at p. 15; see also R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint).
72
R. Vol. 3, p. 383 (underline added). SIO claims that it "paid Monsanto directly" is not
supported by the record. The undisputed evidence in the record is that all payments made by
SIO for silica sand were tendered to WGI and not to Monsanto. R. Vol. 2, pp. 140-41.
73 Id.
70
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to comply with all applicable environmental, safety and control regulations; (2) SIO agreeing to
comply with restrictions on the markets in which SIO would sell the processed silica sand; (3)
Monsanto agreeing to allow SIO to process the silica sand; and (4) Monsanto agreeing to provide
silica sand to SIO indefinitely so long as SIO did not breach the terms of the alleged verbal
agreement. 74 SIO appears to argue that the mixture of both "sale" and "non-sale" terms in the
alleged verbal agreement automatically precludes it from being considered "a contract for the
sale of goods" for purposes of Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code. SIO cites no
case law supporting this position.
Second, SIO alternatively argues that the alleged verbal agreement is not "a contract for
the sale of goods" because its "heart" is somehow not the sale of silica sand from Monsanto to
SIO. SIO claims that "the SIO/Monsanto [verbal] contract does not, at its heart, concern the sale
of sand" but is instead an agreement "permitting SIO to operate a business."75 Based upon its
belief that the "heart" of the alleged verbal agreement was not the sale of silica sand, SIO argues
that the verbal agreement is therefore not "a contract for the sale of goods" for purposes of
Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code. 76 Again, SIO cites no case law supporting
this position.

74

Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 15-16, 19. See also footnotes 48 and 50 above.
Id. at p. 16 (italics added).
76 Id.
75
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For the following reasons, this Court should reject SIO's arguments that the alleged
verbal agreement was not "a contract for the sale of goods" because it included "non-sale" terms,
or alternatively, because its "heart" was not the sale of goods.
First, the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO can be construed as nothing more and
nothing less than an alleged sale of silica sand with supplemental sale terms allowing for the
processing and resale of that same silica sand. Thus, it cannot be disputed that the alleged
agreement involves the sale of goods. "It is clear that if the underlying transaction to the contract
involves the sale of goods, the UCC would apply." Fox v. Mountain West Electric, Inc., 137
Idaho 703, 709, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002); see also LC. § 28-2-102.

Because the verbal

agreement as alleged by SIO involves the sale of goods, there can be no question that it is "a
contract for the sale of goods" subject to Article 2 and its statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1).
On this basis alone, SIO's arguments should be rejected.
Second, even if the alleged verbal agreement is construed to contain both "sale" and
"non-sale" terms, SIO's arguments should still be rejected. The Idaho Supreme Court has had
occasion to consider the application of Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code to
contracts that involve both the "sale of goods" falling within the scope of Article 2 and other
provisions which in isolation may not be subject to Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial
Code. Such contracts are referred to as involving a "hybrid transaction." Fox, 137 Idaho at 709,
52 P.3d at 854; see also Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820, 822, 875 P.2d 232, 234 (Ct. App.
1994). When presented with a hybrid transaction, the district court looks past the fact that there
is a mix of "sale" terms and "non-sale" or "non-goods" terms and instead simply "look[ s] at the

predominant factor of the transaction to determine if the UCC applies." Fox, 137 Idaho at 710,
52 P.3d at 855.
The test for inclusion or exclusion [with regard to the UCC] is not whether
[the terms] are mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their
predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition
of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting)
or is a transaction for sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a
water heater in a bathroom). This test essentially involves consideration of the
contract in its entirety, applying the UCC to the entire contract or not at all.
Id. (quoting Pittsley, 125 Idaho at 822, 875 P.2d at 234)(emphasis added). 77

The legal standard from the Fox case disposes of SIO's first argument that the alleged
verbal agreement is automatically not "a contract for the sale of goods" because it includes both
"sale" and "non-sale" terms. As stated in Fox and quoted above, "The test for inclusion or
exclusion [within the Idaho UCC] is not whether (the terms] are mixed." Fox, 137 Idaho at 710,
52 P.3d at 855 (quoting Pittsley, 125 Idaho at 822, 875 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). As a
matter of law, a contract is not automatically precluded from the application of Article 2 of the
Idaho Uniform Commercial Code simply because it may include both "sale" and "non-sale"
terms.
The legal standard from the Fox case also disposes of SIO's second argument that the
alleged verbal agreement is not "a contract for the sale of goods" because its "heart" was not the
77

This "predominant factor" test has been consistently applied by Idaho appellate courts
whenever a single contract involves both the sale of "goods" within the scope of Article 2 and
other terms that independently may not fall within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., Apple's
Mobile Catering, LLC v. O'Dell, 149 Idaho 211, 233 P.3d 142 (2010)(holding that UCC applied
to entire contract even though goodwill is not a "good" within the scope of Article 2 because the
predominant factor of the transaction was the sale of "goods" falling with the scope of Article 2).
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sale of goods. Pursuant to the Fox case, the "predominant factor" test attempts to determine the
"thrust" and primary "purpose" of the alleged verbal agreement by analyzing whether the sale of
silica sand from Monsanto to SIO is merely incidental to the so-called "non-sale" terms or
whether the so-called "non-sale" terms were incidental to the sale of silica sand.
The answer to this question is quite simple.

The alleged sale of silica sand from

Monsanto to SIO is at the core of the verbal agreement. Without silica sand, SIO would have no
business. Indeed, SIO's entire business plan was to process and sell silica sand. In addition,
none of the so-called "non-sale" terms would have had any application or purpose whatsoever if
SIO did not purchase silica sand from Monsanto. The so-called "non-sale" terms alleged to be
part of the verbal agreement are clearly "incidental" to SIO purchase of the silica sand from
Monsanto. Therefore, the alleged sale of silica sand from Monsanto to SIO was as a matter of
law the "predominant factor" of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO.
"The question of whether goods or services predominate in a hybrid contract is one of
fact", but, "where there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the provisions of the
alleged contract, the district court may resolve the issue as matter of law." Allmand Assocs., Inc.

v. Hercules Inc., 960 S. Supp. 1216, 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also O'Donovan v. Burns, 5
Mass. L. Rep. 317, *8 (Mass. Super. 1996)(same). This same approach appears to have been
applied by appellate courts applying Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code. See Fox v. Mountain

West Electric, Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 52 P.3d 848 (2002); Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820, 875
P.2d 232 (1994); US. v. Twin Falls, 806 F.2d 862 (91h Cir. 1986)(applying Idaho UCC). In this
case for summary judgment purposes, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the
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terms of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO, if such a verbal agreement exists. Thus, the
predominant factor question can be resolved as a matter of law. The district court was correct in
doing so in this case.
Because the "predominant factor" of the alleged verbal agreement was the sale of silica
sand, the entire verbal agreement as alleged by SIO is treated as a "contract for the sale of
goods." See Fox, 137 Idaho at 710, 52 P.3d at 855. The district court therefore correctly
determined that the alleged verbal agreement fell within the scope of Article 2 of the Idaho
Uniform Commercial Code and its statute of frauds in LC.§ 28-2-201(1).
B.

SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's finding that the alleged
verbal contract was for more than $500.

In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds
in LC. § 28-2-201(1), the district court implicitly found that the verbal contract was for more
than $500.

See Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79-80, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215-26

(2009)(affirming implicit findings of district court).

SIO has never argued that the verbal

agreement was for less than $500 and has waived any challenge to this finding by not raising it
on appeal.
C.

SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's implicit finding that no
document signed by Monsanto exists which evidences the alleged verbal
agreement.

In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds
in LC. § 28-2-201(1), the district court implicitly found that no document signed by Monsanto
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exists which evidences the alleged verbal agreement. 78 See Borah, 147 Idaho at 79-80, 205 P.3d
at 1215-26 (affirming implicit findings of district court). SIO has waived any challenge to this
finding by not raising it on appeal. Even if SIO had raised the issue, the record is devoid of any
such document.
D.

SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's finding that no
exceptions apply to the application of the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2201(1 ).

In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds

in I.C. § 28-2-201(1), the district court found that no exceptions to the statute of frauds applied in
this case. 79 SIO has waived any challenge to this finding by not raising it on appeal.
E.

The district court properly concluded that the alleged verbal agreement was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1).

The district court properly found that the alleged verbal agreement was "a contract for the
sale of goods", that it was for more than $500, that no document signed by Monsanto existed
evidencing the alleged verbal agreement, and that no exceptions to the statute of frauds applied
in this case. Based on these findings, the district court properly found that the alleged verbal
agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201 (1 ).
This Court should affirm the district court's finding that the alleged verbal agreement was
unenforceable. SI O's causes of action for breach of the verbal agreement and for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are dependent upon an enforceable verbal

78

R. Vol. 5, pp. 786-89.

79

Id.
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agreement. Because the verbal agreement was found to be unenforceable, this Court should also
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Monsanto dismissing SIO's
causes of action for breach of the verbal agreement and for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SIO'S
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE ALLEGED VERBAL
AGREEMENT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CAN BE AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE
GROUND
THAT
THE
ALLEGED
VERBAL
AGREEMENT WAS
UNEN:FORCEABLE DUE TO ITS ESSENTIAL TERMS BEING VAGUE,
INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN.
Notwithstanding the statute of frauds argument addressed above, the district court's

dismissal on summary judgment of SIO's causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal
agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be affirmed on
the alternative ground that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable due to its essential
terms being vague, indefinite and uncertain. 80 See Ewing v. DOT, 147 Idaho 305, 306, 208 P.3d
287, 288 (2009)("Where an order of a lower court is correct, but is based upon an erroneous
theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory.").
"An agreement that is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties
cannot be ascertained is unenforceable, and the courts are left with no choice but to leave the
parties as they found them." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152
P .3d 604, 609 (2007). "Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the

80

Monsanto raised this argument below. See R. Vol. 1, pp. 90-92.
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essential terms of an agreement, have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable
contract." Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 752, 864 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1993)(quoting 1
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)).
"To be enforceable, a contract must provide a price or a means of determining the price."

Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 93, 233 P.3d 18, 24
(2008)(intemal citations omitted); see also Traylor v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 Idaho 560, 562,
585 P.2d 970, 972 (1978)("In the absence of an agreement between the parties regarding the
amount to be paid ... there was a failure to agree on an essential term of the contract. Such an
agreement is too indefinite to enforce.").

In addition, under Article 2 of the Uniform

Commercial Code, "the quantity of goods" is also an essential term of a contract. See I.C. § 282-201(1); Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 845, 820 P.2d 707, 715 (Ct. App. 1991). The
verbal agreement as alleged by SIO lacks both an essential price term and an essential quantity
term.

As to price, SIO alleges only that Monsanto would accept payment of "agreed-upon

amounts." 81 As to quantity, SIO alleges only that Monsanto would provide "certain agreed-upon
quantities." 82

The verbal agreement as alleged by SIO is unenforceable as a matter of law

because its price and quantity terms as alleged by SIO are vague, indefinite and uncertain.
Under the facts of this particular case, the district court found that duration was also an
essential terms of the alleged verbal agreement. 83

Terms "at issue in the negotiations" are

R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ~11); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ~4).
s2 Id.
83
R. Vol. 5, p. 789-91.
81
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considered "essential terms to that particular agreement." Ogden v. Griffth, 149 Idaho 489, 496,
236 P.3d 1249, 1256 (2010). As alleged by SIO, duration was a critical term of the alleged
verbal agreement and indeed forms the basis of SIO's causes of action. Thus, the district court
properly considered whether the duration term as alleged by SIO was sufficiently certain and
definite to be enforceable.
Although SIO's Complaint alleges that the duration of the verbal agreement was
"perpetual" and "open-ended," 84 SIO now appears to be arguing on appeal that "[t]he evidence
before the district court on summary judgment was that Monsanto, like SIO, contemplated a
long-term relationship--not necessarily perpetual. .. of something more than seven years." 85 SIO
does not attempt to define "long-term relationship" other than to suggest that it may be
somewhere between seven (7) years and something shy of forever. In other words, even SIO
itself has no idea how long the alleged verbal agreement was to continue.

This should be

construed as an admission by SIO on appeal that the duration term as alleged by SIO is indeed
vague, indefinite and uncertain.
The vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty of any one of the three essential terms of
price, quantity and duration are fatal to the enforceability of the alleged verbal agreement. In this
case, all three happen to be vague, indefinite and uncertain. Therefore, the verbal agreement as
alleged by SIO is, as a matter of law, unenforceable because its alleged terms are "so vague,
indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained." Griffith, 14 3 Idaho
84
85

R. Vol. 1, p. 7 (Complaint at ifil 27-28).
Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 24. See also footnote 48 above.
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at 737, 152 P.3d at 609 (2007). The district court's dismissal of SIO's causes of action for
breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the alleged verbal agreement was
unenforceable due to its essential terms being vague, indefinite and uncertain.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND RULED ON
MONSANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SIO'S CAUSES
OF ACTION FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASI-ESTOPPEL.
On appeal, SIO challenges the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of its

causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. SIO contends that Monsanto's initial
summary judgment memorandum did not "articulate a basis for summary judgment on those
claims" 86 of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel and that the district court should therefore not
have granted summary judgment with regard to those causes of action. 87
SIO sought to use the doctrines of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel as bars to the
applicability of the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1). In other words, SIO was hoping to
enforce the alleged verbal agreement under equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel in the event that
it was found unenforceable under the statute of frauds. However, the district court ultimately
found that the alleged verbal agreement as too vague, indefinite and uncertain to enforce. 88
Given that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel are of no effect when dealing

86
87
88

Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20.
Id. at pp. 20-22.
R. Vol. 5, pp. 789-92.
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with a vague, indefinite, and uncertain agreement, dismissal of SIO's claims for equitable
estoppel and quasi-estoppel was appropriate.
Under the law in Idaho, "a nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion need only
respond to issues raised by the moving party." State v. Rubbermaid Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 356,
924 P.2d 615, 618 (1996).

SIO contends that Monsanto's initial summary judgment

memorandum did not "articulate a basis for summary judgment on those claims" for equitable
estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 89 SIO's contention is incorrect.
In its initial summary judgment memorandum, Monsanto argued at length that the
essential tenns of the verbal agreement alleged by SIO were too vague, indefinite and uncertain
to be enforceable. 90 SIO was thereafter obligated to respond to that argument on summary
judgment and in fact did respond to that argument in its response brief. 91 SIO should not be
surprised that the district court granted summary judgment on that basis.

Once

the

alleged

verbal agreement is found unenforceable on the basis that its essential terms are vague, indefinite
and uncertain, causes of action for equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel are of no further effect.
Consequently, the district court was correct in dismissing those causes of action.
Since Monsanto's initial summary judgment brief did in fact seek summary judgment on
the basis that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable on the grounds that its essential
terms were too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable, this Court should reject SIO's

89
90
91

Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20.
R. Vol. 1, pp. 90-92.
R. Vol. 3, pp. 380-83.
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contention that Monsanto's initial summary judgment memorandum did not "articulate a basis
for summary judgment on those claims" for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 92 For this
reason and the reasons discussed below, the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of
SIO' s causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel should be affirmed.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO SIO'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
On appeal, SIO challenges the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of its

cause of action against Monsanto for equitable estoppel. 93 The elements of equitable estoppel
are:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the
person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his
prejudice.

Ogden, 149 Idaho at 495, 236 P.3d at 1255. Equitable estoppel may upon satisfaction of its

elements bar the application of the statute of frauds. Id. Although equitable estoppel may be a

92

Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20.
In dismissing the equitable estoppel cause of action, the district court suggested that the only
alleged promise SIO was attempting to enforce through the application of equitable estoppel was
the alleged promise that Monsanto "would not abruptly terminate its agreement within a few
years after SIO had commenced its business." R. Vol. 5, p. 790-91. This is not entirely accurate.
Through its equitable estoppel cause of action, SIO was attempting to enforce every term of the
verbal agreement as they had been alleged by SIO in this case. See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, pp. 11-14
(Complaint at ,~50-64 with particular emphasis on ,,51 and 56). In other words, SIO was
attempting to use equitable estoppel as a bar to the statute of frauds with regard to the entire
alleged verbal agreement.
93
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bar to the application of the statute of frauds, the underlying representation (i.e. the verbal
agreement) will nevertheless remain unenforceable if its essential terms are vague, indefinite and
uncertain. 94

Id.; see also Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396-97, 162 P.3d 772, 775-76

(2007).
As discussed above in Section II of this brief, the essential terms of price, quantity and
duration of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO are vague, indefinite and uncertain. The
alleged verbal agreement is therefore unenforceable as a matter oflaw. See Griffith, 143 Idaho at
737, 152 P.3d at 609 (2007).

The doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot save an alleged

agreement that is otherwise unenforceable because its essential terms are vague, indefinite and
uncertain. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of SIO's cause of action for equitable estoppel
should be affirmed.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO SIO'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR QUASI-ESTOPPEL.
The district court dismissed SIO's cause of action for quasi-estoppel for the same reason

that it dismissed it cause of action for equitable estoppel. 95 Quasi-estoppel "precludes a party
from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by
94

For this reason, it was unnecessary for the district court to consider the four elements of
equitable estoppel. Although the district court discussed the first element, SIO incorrectly
suggests that the district court made a "factual" determination concerning whether a
representation made by Monsanto was "false." Rather, the district court merely found that the
representation (i.e. the duration of the verbal agreement) was too indefinite to determine its
falsity. Consequently, the district court concluded, "this Court, on the record before it on
summary judgment, cannot find that there are disputed issues of material fact concerning
whether this is a 'false representation."' R. Vol. 5, p. 791.
95
R. Vol. 5, pp. 791-92.

34

him or her . . . where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit." Garner v.
Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003). Although SIO is attempting to use the

doctrine of quasi-estoppel to bar the application of the statute of frauds, the underlying
representation (i.e. the verbal agreement) will nevertheless remain unenforceable if its essential
terms are vague, indefinite and uncertain. Id.; see also Chapin, 144 Idaho at 396-97, 162 P.3d at
775-76. As discussed above, the alleged verbal agreement is unenforceable because its essential
terms of price, quantity, and duration are vague, indefinite, and uncertain. The doctrine of quasiestoppel cannot save an alleged agreement that is otherwise enforceable because its essential
terms are vague, indefinite and uncertain. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of SIO's cause
of action for quasi- estoppel should therefore be affirmed.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF MONSANTO'S MOTION TO STRIKE
WITH REGARD TO HART'S 3/14/2008 EMAIL SHOULD BE AFFIR.l\fED.
In opposition to Monsanto's Motion for Summary Judgment, SIO submitted the Affidavit

of Todd Sullivan. 96 Paragraph 6 of that affidavit stated:
On or about March 13, 2008, I sent another email to Hart, asking him to
confirm the accuracy of certain language I intended to include in correspondence
to Monsanto. Hart responded on March 14, 2008, by noting that my proposed
language "is a fair representation of our discussions and emails." A true and
correct copy of this email chain, commencing with my March 13, 2008, email to
Hart and culminating with Hart's March 14, 2008, response, is attached hereto as
Exhibit B. 97

96

97

R. Vol. 3, p. 437.
Id. at pp. 439, 447-48.
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The attached email from Todd Sullivan dated March 13, 2008, asked that Mr. Hart confirm
whether he was "comfortable" with the following statement:
In conversations and emails I have had with Mitch Hart, we both concur
that an agreement exists between Monsanto and Silicon International Ore in that
Monsanto represented to us that we would be allowed to continue to operate as
long as it was mutually beneficial for us to do so. Meaning that we would be
required to conform to all of Monsanto's environmental, safety and control
regulations, provide Monsanto with royalty payments that would more than offset
any costs Monsanto might incur from our operation, and allow Monsanto to
reasonably control which markets we were able to sell to. Monsanto in tum
assures us certain volumes of sand and allow us to continue to operate the
business. Washington Group International was brought into the mix to help
facilitate this agreement. 98
The attached email from Mr. Hart dated March 14, 2008, stated: "Your statement below is a fair
representation of our discussions and emails." 99 At the time ofthis email, Mr. Hart had for quite
some time not been employed by Monsanto. 100
Monsanto filed a Motion to Strike Hart's 3/14/2008 email and any reference to it on the
basis that the alleged statements contained therein constituted inadmissible hearsay. 101 In

98

Id. at p. 448.
Id. at p. 447.
100
R. Vol. 2, p. 240. Mr. Hart was employed by Monsanto as a mining engineer from 1986 to
2005. Id. He was not a manager and did not have any authority to contract on behalf of
Monsanto. Id. In 2008, approximately three years after he voluntarily left his employment with
99

Monsanto, Mr. Hart was contacted by Mr. Sullivan, who was inquiring about his recollection of
conversations that took place between SIO and Monsanto eight (8) years earlier in 2000. Id. at p.
241. In responding to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hart did not have the benefit of any files, notes or any
of the written contracts to refresh his memory. Id. After reviewing those documents, Mr. Hart
later testified, "To the extent that these emails sent by me in 2008 suggested that there was an
agreement entered into between Monsanto and SIO in 2000 would be in error and a mistake of
mine in 2008 when I was attempting to recollect conversations that occurred 8 years earlier in
early 2000." Id.
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response, SIO argued that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not hearsay and was alternatively
admissible under the residual hearsay exception found in I.R.E. 803(24 ). 102 The district court
disagreed and granted Monsanto's Motion to Strike the reference in Mr. Sullivan's affidavit to
Hart's 3/14/2008 email for purpose of summary judgment. 103
The district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008
email should be affirmed on two alternative grounds. First, it should be affirmed because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.

Second, it should be

affirmed because the exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect a substantial right.

A.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hart's 3/14/2008
email from its consideration on summary judgment.

SIO does not appear to challenge on appeal the district court's decision that the statement
made in Hart's 3/14/2008 email was hearsay. Nevertheless, for the argument on appeal, it is
important to

underst~u1d

why it is hearsay. It is hearsay because the substance of the email was

offered through the testimony of Mr. Sullivan.

Through his affidavit, Mr. Sullivan testifies

concerning the substance of communications made by another person to prove the truth of the
statement made in that communication. This is classic hearsay. See I.RE. 80l(c)('"Hearsay' is
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").

101

R. Vol. 5, pp. 752-59.
Jd. at pp. 761-70.
103
Id. at pp. 781-86.

102
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SIO argued below that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was admissible under the residual hearsay
exception of I.R.E. 803(24 ).
To be admissible under I.R.E. 803(24), the court must determine that (A) the
statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those
in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (B) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact, (C) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,
and (D) the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and the interests of justice,
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Further, (E) a
statement may not be admitted under LR.E. 803(24) unless its proponent gives the
adverse party adequate notice and information regarding use of the statement.

State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 697, 760 P.2d 27, 26 (1988). Among these five requirements, the
district court relied only upon the third in rejecting SIO's argument for the application of Rule
803(24).

Specifically, the district court found that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not "more

probative on the point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence which the proponent
[could] procure through reasonable efforts" 104 because of the following finding:
Both parties involved in this email exchange are available and have filed
affidavits in support of this motion for summary judgment. Therefore, both of
their testimonies can be reasonably be procured. Further, this Court concludes
that their respective personal testimony on this issue is more probative than the
. 105
hearsay e-mai·1 chams.
In other words, the district court found that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not admissible through

lvfr. Sullivan's testimony under Rule 803(24) because Mr. Hart's testimony was freely available
with regard to his 3/14/2008 email.

104
105

I.R.E. 803(24).
R. Vol. 5, p. 783.
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We know that Mr. Hart's testimony was freely available because SIO actually submitted
Mr. Hart's own deposition testimony to the district court for summary judgment purposes.

106

A

review of the deposition transcript shows that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was marked as Deposition
Exhibit 24 and that Mr. Hart acknowledged that it was an email chain between himself and Mr.
Sullivan. 107
Although SIO submitted a copy of the deposition transcript to the district court for
summary judgment purposes, SIO did not provide the district court with any of the exhibits to
Mr. Hart's deposition. Had SIO submitted Deposition Exhibit 24 to the district court with the
deposition transcript, Hart's 3/14/2008 email would have been admissible for purposes of
summary judgment because it would have been submitted through Mr. Hart's own testimony
procured through his deposition. However, SIO chose not to do so and instead chose to offer
Hart's 3/14/2008 email through Mr. Sullivan's testimony -- thereby making it inadmissible
hearsay evidence.
The district court's exclusion of Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony concemmg the
contents of Hart's 3/14/2008 email should be affirmed on appeal. The district court correctly
found that Rule 803(24) was inapplicable because Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony was not
nearly as probative concerning the contents of Hart's 3/14/2008 email as Mr. Hart's own
deposition testimony would have been had a copy of Deposition Exhibit 24 been submitted to the
district court.
106
107

See R. Vol. 4, pp. 501-26 (Transcript of Deposition of Mitchell J. Hart).
R. Vol. 4, pp. 514-515 (Tr. p. 52:18 to 53:3).
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Because the district court correctly concluded that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was fully
available through an admissible evidentiary source which SIO had for some reason opted not to
provide on summary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Rule
803(24) was inapplicable and in excluding Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony concerning Hart's
3/14/2008 email for purposes of summary judgment. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email.
B.

The exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect a substantial right.

In addition, the district court did not err in excluding Hart's 3/14/2008 email because its
exclusion did not affect a substantial right. Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides that "[e]rror
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that "[t]he court at every
stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties." In cases where "a trial court errs in admission or
exclusion of evidence, we will grant a new trial only if the error affected a substantial right."
State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. P'ship, 147 Idaho 718, 726, 228 P.3d 985, 993
(2010).
SIO argues that the exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email "prejudices SIO's substantive
rights" because the email was necessary to prove "the existence of a contract between SIO and
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Monsanto" and the alleged terms of that contract. 108 SIO's argument is without merit. Exclusion
of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect SI O's substantial rights because its admission would not
have altered the district court's findings or conclusion on summary judgment.
First, SIO argues that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was necessary to prove the existence of an
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. This argument fails because the district court did in
fact find that "[t]he evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to SIO, establishes that there was
an oral contract between SIO and Monsanto." 109 The email was therefore not necessary for that
purpose.
Second, SIO argues that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was necessary to prove the terms of the
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. The alleged terms of the verbal agreement however
were already in the record before the district court on summary judgment. Those alleged terms
had been submitted in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan.

110

The district court did not

strike or exclude that paragraph from the affidavit. 111 The alleged terms of the verbal agreement
delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan are identical to the alleged terms
expressed in Hart's 3/14/2008 email. Thus, admission of Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have

108

Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 35-36. SIO specifically argues that the email was necessary
to show "whether [the verbal agreement] was a mere contract for the sale of goods for $500 or
more, or whether it was a broader and more unique agreement that involved not the payment for
goods, but a royalty for sand sold." Id. at 36. By this it is assumed that SIO means that the email
was necessary to prove the alleged terms of the verbal agreement.
109
R. Vol. 5, p. 794.
110
R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-39.
1· 11
R. Vol. 5, p. 786.
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added any new facts to the record which the district court did not already possess and therefore
would not have changed the district court's analysis.
It should be pointed out that, because the issue had been placed before the district court in

the context of a summary judgment motion, the district court was required to accept as true the
alleged terms of the verbal agreement as delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd
Sullivan. See Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 412, 179 P.3d 1064, 1068
(2008)("For purposes of summary judgment, we must take as true Mackay's allegation that the
contract was to last 'until retirement."'); Stanley v. Lennox Indus., 140 Idaho 785, 789, 102 P.3d
1104, 1108 (2004)("It is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the
summary judgment stage."). SIO has not argued on appeal that the district court failed to accept
as true for purposes of summary judgment the alleged terms of the verbal agreement as
delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan. 112 Given that the district court
already possessed admissible evidence of the alleged terms of the verbal agreement and accepted
it as true for purposes of summary judgment, admission of Hart's 3114/2008 email would have
added nothing and would not have altered the district court's analysis.
A review of the district court's analysis in its Memorandum Decision and Order 113
reveals that the district court accepted SIO's claim that a verbal agreement existed and SIO's
alleged terms of that agreement. Notwithstanding, the district court concluded that the verbal
112

In fact, the district court explains in its decision that it fully understood that, on summary
judgment, it was to accept as true admissible evidence in the record and was prohibited from
weighing its credibility. R. Vol. 5, pp. 783-86.
113
Id. at pp. 786-89, 794.
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agreement was governed by Article 2 of the Idaho Unifo1m Commercial Code and subject to the
statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1). The statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1) requires a
writing signed by Monsanto. It is undisputed that Hart's 3/14/2008 email - even if it had been
admitted - was not signed by Monsanto. Consequently, the statute of frauds would still have
applied even if Hart's 3/14/2008 email had been admitted. Therefore, admission of the email
would not have altered the district court's analysis with regard to the statute of frauds.
In addition, Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have altered the district court's analysis
with regard to its dismissal of SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.
As discussed above, dismissal of those causes of action was proper because the underlying
verbal agreement was unenforceable to due vague, indefinite and uncertain terms.

Hart's

3114/2008 email would simply have reinforced the vague, indefinite and uncertain nature of

those terms instead of clarifying them. Therefore, admission of the email would not have altered
the analysis for dismissal of SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.
Because the admission of Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have added any facts to the
record which the district court did not already possess and alternatively because admission of the
email would not have changed in any respect the district court's analysis or conclusion, this
Court should reject SIO's claim that exclusion of Hai1's 3/14/2008 email affected its substantial
rights.
For the aforementioned reasons, it is therefore respectfully requested that this Court
affirm the district court's granting of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's
3/14/2008 email.
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VII.

MONSANTO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
Pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3), the prevailing party "in any action to recover in a

commercial transaction" is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 0 'Shea v. High Mark Dev.,
LLC, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 112, Docket No. 37869 (Idaho Sup. Ct. April 26, 2012).

Each of the

four causes of action asserted by SIO against Monsanto seeks to enforce an alleged verbal
agreement for the sale of silica sand. This alleged verbal agreement for the sale of silica sand
constitutes a "commercial transaction" as defined in I. C. § 12-120(3) because it is a transaction
not "for personal or household purposes." Therefore, it is requested pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3)
that this Court award attorney fees and costs to Monsanto in the event that it prevails on
appeal.114
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of SI O's causes of action against Monsanto. It
is also requested that this Court affirm the district comi's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike
with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email. Lastly, it is requested that Monsanto be awarded its
attorney fees and costs on appeal.

114 SIO does not appeal the district court's award of attorney fees below based upon LC. § 12120(3). In addition, SIO does not request attorney fees on appeal and is therefore precluded from
receiving such an award. See Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22,
30, 137 P.3d 409, 416 (2006)(denying fees on appeal because the issue was not raised or argued
in the briefing). See also I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and I.A.R. 41(a).
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